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Abstract The ‘‘doctor in the loop’’ is a new paradigm in
information-driven medicine, picturing the doctor as
authority inside a loop supplying an expert system with
information on actual patients, treatment results, and pos-
sible additional (side-)effects, including general informa-
tion in order to enhance data-driven medical science, as
well as giving back treatment advice to the doctor himself.
While this approach can be very beneficial for new medical
approaches like P4 medicine (personal, predictive, pre-
ventive, and participatory), it also relies heavily on the
authenticity of the data and thus increases the need for
secure and reliable databases. In this paper, we propose a
solution in order to protect the doctor in the loop against
responsibility derived from manipulated data, thus enabling
this new paradigm to gain acceptance in the medical
community. This work is an extension of the conference
paper Kieseberg et al. (Brain Informatics and Health,
2015), which includes extensions to the original concept.
Keywords P4 medicine  Digital forensics  Manipulation
detection  Data-driven science
1 Introduction and Motivation
While the concept of the ‘‘doctor in the loop’’ seems to be a
logical consequence of the application of machine learning
technologies and derived knowledge into medical science,
one major problem arises: The doctor in question is forced
to trust the results derived from algorithms based on the
authenticity of stored data to a large extent, while being
seen as the primary responsible party during information
provisioning, as well as during treatment, i.e., the doctor
retains responsibility or, in case he/she is involved in the
selection of the source data, even gains more, while loosing
control over the process. With the technology available to
tackle large amounts of complicated data in real time
through Big-Data techniques, results derived from such
processes may even become more uncontrollable. This
opens up the problem of acceptance of the ‘‘doctor in the
loop’’ approach by medical personal. The question is the
trustworthiness of the underlying data and execution
chains, especially considering manipulation, e.g., in the
aftermath of a wrong treatment:
– In case of errors on the doctor side, he/she could try to
cover the tracks by changing the wrongful data that led
to the treatment.
– On the other hand, as the doctor is seen as the
responsible person that is going to be blamed in case of
errors, he/she needs to be ensured that in case the
wrong suggestions came from the system, he/she is
protected against legal actions. Safeguarding the doc-
tors is especially important, since the whole concept
relies on their participation [2].
– Securing the system against manipulation is especially
important in order to generate trust in the system on the
side of the patients and the health care providers.
This is an extended version of [1].
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Furthermore, as a doctor in the loop systems would
logically constitute an ICT-critical infrastructure, data
manipulation could be a possible threat in scenarios of
cyber-crime (e.g., illegal drug acquisition) or cyber-
terrorism (e.g., by seeding distrust toward entities in the
national health system).
Thus, in order to mitigate these risks for the overall con-
cept, manipulations in the underlying database need to be
detected, as well as control over the information entered by
the doctor needs to be safeguarded against subsequent
manipulation. This also includes the manipulation-secure
logging of execution chains of enrichment and analytics
algorithms and workflows. The contribution of this work
can be summarized as follows (see also [1]):
– We provide a model of the ‘‘doctor in the loop
concept’’ including an abstract architecture of its
entities with respect to security.
– Attack scenarios and attacker models against this
approach are devised.
– Based on these models, strategies for mitigation are
defined.
Compared to the conference paper, the following exten-
sions are provided in this work:
1. Extension of the approach to multiple decision makers
(see Sect. 3.3).
2. Adaption of the approach in order to be suitable for
closed-source Database Management Systems
(DBMSs) and environments (see Sect. 3.4).
3. In-depth discussion of limitations and possible coun-
termeasures (see Sect. 4.3).
2 Background and related Work
2.1 Experts in the loop and medical databases
Interactive machine learning has been a very popular
topic in research throughout the recent years, especially
considering the medical domain with its vast amount of
applications in the sectors of diagnosis, as well as treat-
ment. In [3], the authors provide a comprehensive com-
parison on different training algorithms for supervised
machine learning, mainly focusing on the aspects of
speed, accuracy, and scalability. Focusing on the pure
algorithmic level, matters of security and especially data
protection are left out. Alongside this work, [4] discusses
how computer-assisted presentation of case data can help
experts to infer machine-implementable rules for case
definition in electronic health records. Here, the authors
apply an expert in the loop approach and demonstrate the
usefulness of their techniques with a practical medical
example on acute liver dysfunction (ALD). Furthermore,
a multitude of applied work that utilizes data mining and
(interactive) machine learning in medical research has
been proposed in the recent past like [5] for the prediction
of heart diseases, or [6] discussing possible applications
in radiology. In [7], the authors consider not only the
benefits, but also the challenges when mining electronic
health records (EHRs).
Regarding sharing of information in medical databases,
in [8] the authors discuss the effects of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 on medical
research, namely the production of large-scale databases of
patient data allowing better and larger studies. While
acknowledging the need for removing protected patient
information, the paper focusses more on the benefits of data
sharing without acknowledging malicious intent. Various
works exist on the problem of de-anonymization of health
records (e.g., [9]), which is thus not in the focus of this
work, since the architecture proposed in this work allows
the application of various kinds of additional countermea-
sures in order to protect patient privacy. In their work [10],
the authors propose a practical framework under develop-
ment that makes recent developments in the realm of
machine learning accessible to practitioners. This is based
on their observation that despite the fundamental devel-
opments on the theoretical and conceptual side, adoption of
machine learning techniques by practitioners has been low.
Still, while providing many practical considerations, the
topic of security and protection of sensitive data was only
touched slightly in this concept.
The problem of securing infrastructures relying on
human behavior has been discussed throughout the last
decade and more, being one of the very fundamental
problems for computer security [11]. The problem is often
related to the issues of awareness [12] or missing usability
in security [13], as well as other subtopics, also including
the sharing of data between different entities [14] where
each participant has his/her own agenda in dealing with the
supplied data. It has to be kept in mind that research data
forms a very valuable resource for many research labora-
tories. This is also often related to the issues of providing
health-related information to other clinicians [15] or to
automated systems [16], where the original owner of the
data loses control over the further dissemination. In [17],
the authors identify security and privacy issues as one of
the major open research issues in the development of
medical cyber-physical systems (MCPS), especially con-
sidering that interoperability capabilities will open up new
attack surfaces that can be misused to harm patients by,
e.g., manipulation of data or direct access to critical system
components.
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2.2 Chained witnesses
The term ‘‘chained witnesses’’ was coined in [18], where
the authors propose a technique for securing internal
mechanisms of databases against manipulation. The main
advantage of this approach over the multitude of approa-
ches described in the literature was resilience against an
attacker model that included the database administrator as
possible adversary. While this is discussable in most real-
life systems where the database administrator is seen as a
trusted entity, this is especially interesting in the ‘‘doctor in
the loop’’ concept.
The main principle of this approach lies in appending a
so-called witness for each transaction that is issued against
the database to the internal logging mechanisms: The
database storing the information is considered as untrusted;
furthermore, even file system administrator rights are
assumed for the attacker. Let Di be the ith data record
written to the database at time ti. Furthermore, we assume
that H is a cryptographically secure one-way hash function,
T is a trusted third party, and R is a secure pseudo random
number generator (PRNG) and ri is the result of its ith
iteration. The witness for transaction Di is calculated as
wi ¼ Hðwi1jjDijjtijjriÞ ¼ Hðwi1jjDijjtijjRðri1ÞÞ
with || denoting string concatenation. The tuple ðti;wiÞ is
then called the signature of the record Di. In order to start
the hash-chain, an initialization phase is required: A
trusted third party T selects a random number s as seed
for the PRNG and thus generates r0 by using the PRNG
on s. Furthermore, the initial witness is defined as
w0 :¼ Hðr0Þ.
Due to the definition of the witnesses as chained hashes,
any changes in older datasets lead to cascading changes in
all subsequent witnesses (Fig. 1 shows the chaining). For
the verification, the data of the protected internal logging
mechanisms are executed against an old trusted backup
under the premise of T and compared to the investigated
database instance. This also works, when reverting the
whole database to an old state: The PRNG is seeded with a
seed unknown to the attacker, every iteration changes the
state of the PRNG, which cannot be calculated backwards
(this is ensured by the criteria for the hash function and the
PRNG in [18]). Thus, in the case of reverting, the states of
the missing entries can be detected easily. In [18], the
authors propose several mechanisms for achieving this kind
of manipulation security in real-life environments, espe-
cially targeting internal database mechanisms for providing
rollbacks (so-called transaction logs2). The transaction log
is stored directly by the database environment as an
internal component. Figure 1 also demonstrates, how the
log entry is extended in order to store the witness, more
details on the exact specification of the log entries can be
found in [18]. Furthermore, the database management
system (DBMS) must be modified in a way to provide the
calculation of the respective witness as an atomic action,
invisible to and uninterruptable by the administrator, i.e.,
the mechanism for writing the transaction log needs to be
modified directly in the DBMS-code in order to fetch the
random numbers ri and calculate the witness immediately,
without leaking ri to the administrator. As shown in [18],
the implementation of such a process can be done for
MySQL; furthermore, the authors pointed out solutions for
closed-source DBMSs based on the database replication
logs.
2.3 The doctor in the loop
The concept of the ‘‘doctor in the loop’’ is an extension of
the increasingly frequent use of knowledge discovery for
the enhancement of medical treatments together with the
‘‘human in the loop’’ concept: The expert knowledge of the
doctor is incorporated into ‘‘intelligent’’ systems (e.g.,
using interactive machine learning) and enriched with
additional information and expertise. Using machine
learning algorithms, medical knowledge and optimal
treatments are identified. This knowledge is then fed back
to the doctor to assist him/her (see Fig. 2).
While general techniques regarding data-driven research
have their own problems with respect to privacy protection
(see e.g., [19]), an additional major problem for the doctor
in the loop lies in guaranteeing the trustworthiness of the
data provided by other entities and by analysis workflows.
Furthermore, the data provided by the doctor need to be
Fig. 1 Construction and storage of the chained witnesses
2 It must be noted that the term ‘‘logs’’ is slightly misleading, since
these are not human readable log files, but internal mechanisms for
ensuring transaction safety
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secured against subsequent manipulation in the case of a
cover up, either by the system, or by the doctor him-/her-
self. In this work, we will solely focus on this problem and
leave the problems of privacy protection and data leakage
discovery to the literature [14, 20].
3 The Approach
The approach outlined in this section is based on the
generic concept of the ‘‘doctor in the loop’’ as described in
Sect. 2.3. In order to motivate the chaining approach, we
will define the entities and their relations, including the
chaining mechanism.
3.1 Entities and relations
For our analysis, we define a more specific model for the
doctor in the loop. Figure 3 gives an overview on the
components:
– The Doctor, who is the main expert in the cycle,
collects data from patients, including their reactions to
individual treatments and potential other effects. Fur-
thermore, he/she provides additional knowledge from
his/her experience and sanity-checks results. All data
he/she provides to the system are sent to the Knowl-
edge Base, which also provides him/her with the
relevant feedback. In the basic approach, we resort to a
single doctor entity, which is rather uncommon in real-
life environments, the required extensions to the
chaining can be found in Sect. 3.3.
– The Knowledge base provides the store for the data and
all results of workflows and external resources, as well
as the only means for communication between the
doctor and the other entities. This entity is the primary
target for our chained witnesses approach, since all data
that are transferred between the relevant entities for the
‘‘doctor in the loop’’ approach utilize it. The knowledge
base may also host stored procedures for the analysis of
the data, i.e., parts of the ML-grid are implemented as
stored procedures inside the knowledge base.
– The Grid serves as a generic model for a machine
learning/reasoning structure that takes input data and
returns results using analytics algorithms. The grid may
be implemented as external mediation tool, as well as
in the form of internal stored procedures inside the
knowledge base. In our concept, the exact definition of
the grid will be kept on an abstract level, since
providing manipulation security will be done on the
side of the underlying database of the knowledge base.
– Interfaces from other entities to the knowledge base are
logged by the underlying DBMS. This includes all
transactions changing data or structures in the database,
as well as the change and invocation of stored
procedures that may implement part of the grid.
– The entity Medical research denotes external knowl-
edge bases that serve as external data input to the grid,
or to the knowledge base.
– ML research provides the grid with new algorithms
for the analysis of the data stored in the knowledge
base.
3.2 Interaction and chaining
For the abstract approach, we only consider a general sce-
nario where a generic data receiving decision makerM (e.g.,
the doctor) sends data to a generic data store S (e.g., the
knowledge base). Furthermore, an entity P, the data provi-
der, operates on the same database and delivers a result toS.
M takes a result (e.g., a treatment) based on the data in the
database and returns additional information, especially on
the reaction of the patient and other (side-)effects. Further-
more, M controls the results stored in S with respect to
sanity-checks based on his/her background knowledge and
issues respective corrections toS that are subsequently used
by P. From a security point of view, this especially implies
that the exact order of the transactions with respect to the
knowledge base is of vital importance in order to guarantee
authenticity.
Fig. 2 The doctor in the loop
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3.2.1 Data provider
The model of P is selected to be as generic as possible and
covers all single data providing entities except the decision
maker. This especially includes all parts of the grid, as well
as additional data sources with respect to Sect. 3.1. Due to
the assumption that P might be some proprietary entity,
incorporating additional mechanisms for controlling the
decision provider(s) is not reasonable. Furthermore, P
might in reality consist of several different entities (internal
stored procedures and external workflow engines), i.e., M
might provide data to and receive information from several
different data providers Pi; i 2 N. Thus, the P only needs
to fulfill the following pre-requisites:
1. All results are written to S, there is no additional side
channel to M, i.e., M and P are independent.
2. Everything sent to S by P is signed using state-of-the
art cryptographic technologies and is therefore
assumed to be unforgeable.
Especially requirement two seems to be strong, still this is
a standard requirement in many current communication
protocols.
3.2.2 Data store
The data store possesses an internal table structure for
storing all collected data, invoked enrichment algorithms,
as well as the received data, protected with the chained
witnesses approach: For each entry in the transaction log
Di, the respective signature ðti;wiÞ is stored (see [18]). It
must be kept in mind that the only connection between two
entries Di and Dj lies in their timely succession, i.e., all
changes in all tables are stored in the same transaction
mechanism, ordered by the time of entering ti. This also
holds true in case of several decision makers Mi. In the
setup phase, the initialization is done by a trusted third
party T (see below). We furthermore assume that the data
store is run independently from the underlying physical
server, i.e., S possess administrator privileges over all
tables, as well as full access to the file system for enrich-
ment and processing of incoming and outgoing data, as
well as for restructuring the database layout (tables, views
...), including full control over log settings. Still, it does not
possess root privileges on the underlying machine, which is
run by T or another trusted entity. In addition, the data
store frequently sends a backup to T, which is validated as
shown below. The newly validated database image itera-
tively serves as the new base point for the next validation
cycle.
3.2.3 Decision maker
The decision maker M is independent from the data store,
i.e., it does not have any control over S. Furthermore, it is
also independent from all data providers (see there). In this
approach, we assume that the decision maker is honest in
general (see data insertion).
3.2.4 Trusted third party
The trusted third party T controls and manages the random
values needed in the chained witnesses approach for the
data store. During the setup phase, a new random seed s is
selected and the first random value r0 is generated using the
cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator
(PRNG). Furthermore, the first witness w0 ¼ HðrÞ is sent
to M. Additionally, T can be the entity responsible for
running the physical server for S, including root privileges.
While T is thus in a very powerful position, T must be
independent from all other entities, especially from all data
providing parties, thus possessing no interest in data
Fig. 3 Entities and Relations
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manipulation. Furthermore, interaction between S and T is
limited to the setup phase and during the verification of
authenticity.
3.2.5 Network providers
The network provider is responsible for enabling the
communication between the data provider and the decision
maker. We assume that all traffic is protected by end-to-
end encryption against eavesdropping, other attacks by a
malicious network provider, e.g., denial of service, are not
inside the scope of this paper. This also holds true for the
underlying public key infrastructure that is needed in order
to facilitate the encrypted communication.
3.2.6 Data insertion
The decision maker is modeled to receive data from outside
machine-based systems, especially by the patients during
personal consultation. As outlined later in the attacker
model in Sect. 4.1, we assume that the decision maker is in
principle honest, i.e., at the time of consultation, no harm
toward the patient is intended from his/her side. This also
means that the data entered into the database are correct at
the time of insertion. All data received by the patients are
immediately stored to S.
3.2.7 Verification of authenticity
In the verification step, T extracts the internal transaction
logs (this is possible using a method provided in [21]) and
uses a trusted backup as starting point for consecutive
execution of the log entries, thus verifying the witness for
each transaction by using the secret initialization vector
s and the PRNG. The first encountered invalid witness
provides the position of a manipulation of the log. Fur-
thermore, the result of the verification is compared bit-wise
to the current database, thus being able to uncover changes
done directly in the underlying file system.
3.3 Multiple decision makers
The basic approach is very limited with respect to the
human interfaces, i.e., it only considers a single decision
maker M (e.g., one doctor). This approach, while reason-
able for demonstrating the fundamental chaining mecha-
nism and providing a fundamental security analysis, has a
very large drawback. In a real-life environment, e.g., a
research lab for biomedical research, several decision
makers Mi will be involved for different reasons: The
advice of experts on different medical fields might be
needed, as well as different experts from the same field in
order to reduce errors and enhance accuracy (see Fig. 4).
We assume without loss of generality that all Mi use the
same interfaces to the database, being capable of changing
the same tables, attributes, and even records. This is done
in order to formulate the problem of attribution of changes
as general as possible and allowing the greatest amount of
inferences between the decision makers, also including
malicious collaboration. While secrecy of the data entered
by the Mi is not an issue in this architecture, vital impor-
tance is put on the aspects that no decision maker (or any
combination of Mi) is capable of (i) hiding his/her/their
changes, (ii) planting changes as if they were issued by
someone else, or (iii) changing the logged order of changes
with respect to the application order (i.e., a transaction Ti is
logged after Tj with i\j).
In order to implement this chaining into the architecture,
the following pre-requisites are assumed:
1. All decision makers Mi use different user profiles for
accessing the database.
2. The attribution of the statement to the respective user
issuing it can be done on the DBMS-internal level, i.e.,
the transaction mechanism has access to the actual user
issuing the request. This is typically available for
DBMSs like MySQL with InnoDB in order to provide
access control. This also means that the database
administrator cannot control the attribution of state-
ments to the log.
3. The same holds true for the database replication
mechanism in case of a closed-source DBMS, see
Sect. 3.4.
The calculation of the chained witnesses can then be
extended to account for the attribution mechanism to
specific users by including the user-id Mi for the i-th user
into the chaining (see also Fig. 5). The witness for trans-
action Di is calculated as
Fig. 4 Multiple doctors in the loop




In MySQL, the user-id Mi can easily be included by a very
simple rewrite in the logging routines: Since the InnoDB
storage engine provides ACID-compliance, the user is
known to the transaction mechanism, the linking is thus
quite simple to implement.
3.4 Adaption to closed-source environments
Unfortunately for the original approach, a lot of systems
typically accessed by doctors and put to work in medical
research environments are not fully open source. Especially
regarding high-performance database management systems,
the major vendors like Teradata, IBM (DB2), and ORACLE
stay closed-source. Thus, contrary to the scenario in case of
using open source alternatives, changes directly to the
transaction mechanism are neither feasible nor practical. In
order to employ the original concept of the chained witnesses
for the doctor in the loop, internal mechanisms that have a
passive, read-only interface to the outside world need to be
employed. As outlined in [18], the database replication
mechanism is a suitable choice for supporting the approach:
The task of this mechanism lies in mirroring a database
instance, typically referred to as master instance to several
so-called slaves, instances that are exact copies of the orig-
inal database. Typically, this mechanism is employed in
order to generate redundant copies for so-called hot backups,
allowing the possibility to switch from the master instance to
a slave instance transparently, e.g., in the case of defects on
the master instance. Thus, the information that needs to be
stored in the slave instances is typically not limited to the
datasets alone, but includes vital information on the struc-
ture, large objects and even metadata like session informa-
tion and timestamps. It is thus possible to adapt the chained
witnesses approach to this interface, as shown in Fig. 6.
In this approach, the data stream from the master
instance to the slave instances is captured and the witnesses
are added right before sending the stream to the slaves.
This requires that the whole signing procedure is added in
an extra node right on the transport layer. Since the data
stream of the data replication mechanism is typically not
documented for many closed-source DBMSs and might
change between releases, the information is not decoded
but the whole stream is simply split into blocks of a pre-
defined length. These blocks are then chained using the
original approach, still, due to the need to control an active
slave instance for verification purposes, the trusted third
party T is far more involved compared to the original
approach using the transaction mechanism:
– Since the replication mechanism extracts all changes to
an actual separate database instance instead of some
internal mechanism stored on the same machine,
attacks by the root of the master instance need to take
place when the data are written, i.e., even for an
attacker with root privileges, it is not possible to later
on alter the data that were submitted to the slave
instance under the control of T.
– Internal transaction mechanisms are typically limited in
terms of disk space that is provided for them and older
entries are removed after a while. While this is no
problem per se in the original approach, since the
chaining still needs to be valid, and regular audit of old
entries allows (i) the removal of such old entries
without implications to the verifiability and (ii) reduce
the workload needed to be carried out in the case of a
check for manipulations, using the replication mecha-
nism allows for a much more transparent implementa-
tion, where no changes are deleted and the whole
history of the original database can be rolled back.
– Since the replication mechanism is made for reliable
mirroring of databases, it can be accessed very easily
and without tinkering with the DBMS in place. This is
not only interesting in the case of closed-source
approaches, but also reduces the implementation over-
head in case of switching to a new version of the same
Fig. 5 Modified chained witnesses for multiple Mi
Fig. 6 Verification with replication ([18])
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DBMS. While the transaction mechanism as an internal
function is typically undocumented and can be altered
between even minor version changes, the interfaces to
the replication mechanism will stay much more
stable and changes will be documented well.
The main drawback of this modification compared to the
original approach lies in the effort on the side of the trusted
third party T: Instead of storing a random seed and only
having to become active in case of manipulation detection
or maintenance, T has to operate a full instance of the
DBMS with at least the same performance capabilities with
respect to data insertion. Furthermore, in case of com-
mercial platforms, this also includes additional costs for
licenses, as well as trained personnel for operation. This
also hinders outsourcing this task to a central authority that
provides the services of a trusted third party to several
different operators.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Attacker models and attack vectors
In this section, we give a description of the attacker models
and attack vectors with respect to the assets of the ‘‘doctor
in the loop’’ approach.
4.1.1 Data provider and decision maker
Both entities could have the interest of manipulating data
on the data store in case of cover ups, e.g., manipulating
previously delivered incorrect data. The main attack vector
of the decision maker lies in updating data on the data
store, provided either by itself, or as result (treatment) data
from the data provider. The data provider possesses the
same attack vectors, but in addition, he/she might try to
manipulate and/or re-execute stored procedures that oper-
ate on the data in order to cover up wrong results. In order
to keep the concept as simple and strong as possible, we
assume that there is no dedicated secure application con-
trolling access to and from the database by the entities, i.e.,
the entities write their changes directly into the data store.
This is especially important in order to be secure against
SQL-injections or related attacks by default.
4.1.2 Data store
The data store itself is an important entity in the overall
concept, since it serves as the central data exchange plat-
form and is thus vital for providing trust in the ‘‘doctor in
the loop’’ concept. The database administrator controls all
access to the database, including the possibility to undo
logs, as well as change arbitrary data and structures. Fur-
thermore, not only the database itself, but also the under-
lying file system, can be of interest for an attacker: As
outlined in related work [21], file carving techniques can
be used in order to retrieve or manipulate data by directly
accessing the database files on the file system. In this
evaluation, we thus concentrate on these two fundamental
attack vectors:
– The Database administrator (DBA) possesses admin-
istrator privileges on the database itself, including the
ability to change logging routines and user rights, as
well as read access to the underlying file system.
– The File system administrator (FSA) can modify
arbitrary files on the server, including the files belong-
ing to the database, as well as the OS (system) logs. He
has no access to the database query interface though.
Neither of the two attackers possesses root privileges on
the respective database server.
4.2 Security evaluation
In this section, we will analyze the respective assets that
could be targeted by the attackers modeled in the previous
section.
4.2.1 Manipulation through the database (All except FSA)
Both, the data provider, as well as the decision maker could
be interested in reissuing incorrectly entered data. In case
they act with their own privileges, i.e., as data provider or
decision maker, every modification of data is stored in the
internal logs, together with the respective timestamp of the
change, making it easily detectable. In case the attacker
possesses administrator privileges on the DBMS (DBA),
the internal log mechanisms are under the full control of
the attacker, except for the chaining: Since the attacker still
does not possess root privileges on the server, it is
impossible for him/her to read the value ri from the RAM,
which is then used in the generation of the witness with H.
Since H is a cryptographic hash function, when given
h :¼ Hðh0Þ, h0 cannot be deduced from h. This also holds
true for the closed-source approach, the hashing is still
done the same way, the main difference lies in the fact that
the chained blocks are not aligned with logical borders of
statements, but using a fixed block size.
4.2.2 Targeting stored procedures (DBA)
The database administrator can execute and modify every
stored procedure on any stored dataset. Still, in case exe-
cutions change any data in any table in the database, the
changes are logged in order to retain transaction safety.
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Since data replication is used to provide hot backups, these
changes are immediately sent to the slave nodes.
4.2.3 Manipulation through database files (FSA)
The file system administrator could bypass all logging
mechanism by manipulating data directly in the underlying
database files. This includes the transaction log and other
rollback mechanisms, which have to be invoked by the
DBMS. Using the witnesses, these changes remain
detectable, since the resulting database in the verification
step will be different from the one currently on the server.
Still, the attacker could insert data via the file system and
remove it right before the validation, making this manip-
ulation undetectable. As a countermeasure, the validation
process should be done frequently at random times. Fur-
thermore, we propose to use the chaining witnesses
approach with respect to special logs containing checksums
of the database files. This attack can be omitted in case of
the closed-source approach, since the attacker does not
have access to the database files of the slave instance under
the ownership of T.
4.2.4 Manipulation of the DBMS
The attacker could remove the chaining witnesses from the
source code of the DBMS and install a recompiled version.
While this is possible, this action would require root
privileges on the server. Furthermore, modifications on the
binary could be easily detected via frequent comparison of
checksums of the respective code to the originally issued
version.
4.2.5 Modification of the transaction mechanism (DBA)
The authenticity of the information in the transaction
mechanism/log is protected by the chained witnesses
approach, so every manipulation can be detected under the
given attacker model and the manipulated record can be
identified. This could only be circumvented by deleting the
whole log, which itself is an highly obvious manipulation
pointing to the database administrator.
4.2.6 Combined attackers
In the above examples, we split the attacker between the
DBA and the FSA, still, the resilience of the approach is
retained even in case the attacker possesses both privileges.
This can be directly inferred from this section, since the
chaining is done on DBMS level, without the involvement
of either, the DBA or the FSA.
4.3 Limitations
The limitations of the proposed approach can mainly be
attributed to limitations of the original chained witnesses
approach, especially regarding the lifetime of the internal
transaction logs and problems related to an attacker pos-
sessing root privileges: Since such an attacker is expected
to have full control over every aspect of the system, the
following additional attack vectors are available that the
approach is vulnerable to
– Modification of the DBMS In case of root privileges, the
attacker can simply modify the DBMS in such a way as
to either remove the chained logging altogether (which
is rather obvious and easy to spot), or by modify the
chaining in order to give exclusive powers of manip-
ulation: For example, the attacker could replace the
hash function H with a weaker version, or take control
over the generation of the random numbers ri, both
allowing him/her to later on manipulate entries, while
still using the protection mechanism against other
entities.
– Control over memory With full control over the
memory of the machine the DBMS is running on, the
attacker could simply record the sequence of random
numbers ri and thus manipulate older entries. While
this is possible in theory, the attack possesses one issue
in real implementations: The changes must be done on
the transaction log by removing all current entries
down to the point of manipulation and then recreating
them using the sequence ri. This can be a problem in
case of running databases in case of rollbacks or crash
recoveries during the manipulation process.
– Control over interfaces Especially considering the
closed-source approach with full control over all
interfaces, the attacker is capable of manipulating the
data streams sent to the slave instances, while making
no changes on the master instance.
Furthermore, the approach only works with DBMSs that
actually provide transaction safety or data replication and
thus provide the respective mechanisms.
More specific to the architecture provided in this paper,
the main limitation lies in the assumption of independence
of the different entities, which in reality may not be
guaranteed due to the setup of the overall environment
(e.g., a hospital running a ‘‘doctor in the loop’’ approach
might control the doctor, the database and parts of the grid,
as well as T). Against attacks arising from this overlap in
duties and authorities, managerial countermeasures
regarding organizational security must be employed,
starting with strict separation of duties and reliance on an
external party T.
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5 Conclusion and Future Outlook
In this work, we provided an approach for protecting
decision-relevant data in a generic ‘‘doctor in the loop’’
setup against manipulations targeting the underlying data-
base, including closed-source database management sys-
tems. This is especially needed in order to increase trust in
the ‘‘doctor in the loop’’ concept for both sides, the
involved medical personnel, as well as external partners
and research labs providing results based on the data. In
order to allow for a real-life audit and control system, we
additionally provided means for attribution of changes with
respect to several decision makers (doctors).
Future work is especially needed in the area of usability
in order to effectively incorporate the architecture into the
daily routines without introducing even more overhead for
the medical personal, thus enabling the ‘‘doctor in the
loop’’ to use the benefits of machine-supported medicine.
Future work from our side includes the development of a
prototype implementation in order to test the effects of
introducing this concept into real-life environments,
specifically targeting the scientific field of biomarker
research.
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